It has been claimed that certain forms of individual essentialism render the Theory of Natural Selection unable to explain why any given individual has the traits it does. Here, three reasons are offered why the Theory ought to ignore these forms of essentialism. First, the trait-distributions explained by population genetics supervene on individual-level causal links, and thus selection must have individual-level effects. Second, even if there are individuals that possess thick essences, they lie outside the domain of the Theory. Finally, the contingency of sexual reproduction suggests that essentialism is misguided in this arena.
The problem
On the face of it, natural selection explains a huge number of facts in the biological domain; explanatory consilience has been touted again and again as a major epistemic virtue of Darwin's theory. What is more, the way in which natural selection explains these facts is especially significant. Ever since Aristotle, biologists had standardly appealed to essences and necessary truths in trying to understand how organisms are adapted to their environments, and their capacity to reproduce themselves. But natural selection shows how most or all these properties originated contingently.
It is ironic, then, that Tim Lewens ([2001] ) and Joel Pust ([2001] ), both strong advocates of the theory of natural selection, have recently arrived at the conclusion that because biological organisms possess certain properties necessarily-because they have essences, in short-the explanatory power of natural selection with respect to these individuals is reduced. Their arguments Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 54 (2003) , 297-308, axg014 seem to imply that the theory of natural selection has not in fact eliminated all essences. And because it has not, they suggest, its explanatory power is less than one might think.
In this article, I re-examine the issue in the light of Lewens' recent arguments. I will try to show that Pust and Lewens are wrong to think that the theory of natural selection should be constrained by, or should even entertain, metaphysical propositions that are not only outside its compass, but seemingly incongruent with its own metaphysical thrust.
A reprise of the controversy
It was Elliott Sober ([1984] , p. 148) who first broached the issue of explaining the traits of individuals. His argument rested, in effect, on the premise that natural selection is destructive, not creative.
Sober's argument: selection as exclusionary
An exclusionary process P (an entrance exam, for example) may cause it to be true that all the students in a class possess a certain qualification, Q. It does this simply by excluding those who do not possess it. However, P was not the cause of any particular member of the class possessing Q. All it did was ensure that all the students admitted already possessed Q.
Sober's thought was that selection is just such an exclusionary force. It does not create traits in anyone. It simply eliminates those who do not possess a particular trait. (Note, however, that this applies to lineages not individuals. I have an opposable thumb, and I did not have one before selection caused it to be the case that all humans have opposable thumbs.) Thus, natural selection may explain trait distributions, that is, facts such as that all, some, 64% of, or no individuals in a population possess Q. It explains these by asserting that natural selection had, at some time in the past, eliminated more of the organisms that lacked Q than those that possessed this trait. But selection did not create Q in any organism. Thus, it does not explain of any particular individual why it possesses any trait. The claim, in short, is that in the Theory of Natural Selection, explanations of distributive facts fail to 'translate downwards' (as I shall say) to facts about individuals. (The italicized qualifier is important: the argument has no bearing on statistical thermodynamics, for instance, though it, too, is concerned with distributional facts in a way that casts doubt on their efficacy in explaining individual events. The point has to do with the alleged exclusionary character of selection, not its statistical character.) I will call Sober's position 'AntiIndividualism'. Karen Neander ([1988 Neander ([ ], [1995a Neander ([ ], [1995b ) has taken issue with Sober's view. The following is, I believe, a fair way of putting her point (though it is not exactly hers).
Neander's view: selection as creative
It is too narrow a view of selection to consider it merely as exclusionary. When we think about how genes created by mutation take hold in a population-the fixation of new traits because they are adaptive, the creation of further traits that modify the newly fixed traits, the modification of traits to fit newly available niches, and so on-we come to realise that we are dealing with a creative process. Natural selection is not just differential retention. It is the channelling, by means of environmental factors, of traitchange initiated by mutation.
Neander's view can be rephrased by saying that selection is a creative process. She can be read as insisting that, so conceived, it explains the traits of individuals, not just trait distributions. I will call this position 'Individualism'.
In my view, Neander's defence of Individualism has not received the attention it deserves. For if you allow that selection created a trait F, then it seems that you should allow that it is at least a part of what caused me to have F. After all, I would not have had F if selection had not first created it. I will not discuss Neander's argument explicitly in what follows. In part, this is because it is somewhat obscure what she takes 'selection' to be, and how she takes it to be a cause. Is it a well-demarcated set of historical eventsmutations, births, matings, deaths, etc.-that is supposed to have resulted in the creation of new traits? Or are these traits supposed to have been thrown up by the operation of a statistical trend, independently of particular happenings?
1 Until these questions are answered in some detail, the idea that evolution shapes traits will lack explicit content-we will see why this is important in Section 4, below. Despite these reservations, Neander's important point is in the background of my thinking below. Sober's ([1995] ) reply to Neander did not address her main point, as outlined above. It consisted instead in an especially clear and characteristically clever illustration of why an exclusionary process cannot explain individual traits (and why Neander's emphasis on the cumulativity of selection does not change this). This argument, challenging though it is, does not address the issue of the creativity of evolution as understood by Neander. After all, the absence of II and its descendants can easily have effects on III; the traits that this line possesses might well be shaped by the environment in which II is absent: that is the kind of influence that Neander had in mind. Sober's argument focusses on the difference between creativity and destructiveness. All that natural selection did in the above case was eliminate the lineage that would have started with II. The lineage that passes from I to III was, in some sense, in existence all along; the events described above may have contributed to its continuance, but not to III possessing G. Note, as an aside, that by contrast with Neander, it is clear how Sober is conceptualizing 'selection' here: namely, as a well-demarcated set of historical events-a mutation and an environmental interaction-which causes first the production of the organism II and then its demise.
In my contribution to this debate (Matthen, [1999] ), the primary target was the above-mentioned argument of Sober's. I argued that, plausible though it was for the case of asexual reproduction, Sober's argument was implausible when it came to sexually reproducing organisms.
2 I will present the argument here in the slightly modified form that Lewens ([2001] ) gives to it.
Matthen's argument: sexual reproduction and creativity
A certain sheep, Steve, has a trait labelled 'strong wool' as a consequence of possessing genotype AA. One of the ways to explain why he possesses AA is to look at the contribution of his parents. His mother, Suzy, also possessed AA. Because of selection, there are in fact no (or perhaps very few) alternative alleles in the population to which Suzy belongs: all (or most) sheep in this population are AA. (Alternatively, one could suppose that, because of selection, Suzy tends to prefer mates who are AA.) Because selection has given her no (or very little) choice, Suzy mates with a male AA. Consequently, she was caused by selection to have offspring with genotype AA, which produces strong wool. Thus selection explains why Steve has strong wool. (By parity, one could have routed the argument through Steve's father, Sam.)
This seems to show that Steve's traits are explained (in part) by selection, regardless of what kind of entity selection might be. (The term 'selection' is just functioning as a place-holder in the above argument.) In effect, it challenges the idea that selection is merely exclusionary; Suzy is creating new lineages by her choice of mates, and her creative acts are constrained by past selection events. So at least in the case of sexual reproduction, where new lineages are created in a branching tree-like structure, selection does seem to play a role in explaining why individuals have the traits they do. Lewens ([2001] ) disagrees with this argument, for reasons we will discuss in a moment. But he also adds an important new consideration for Individualists.
Lewens' concession: evo-devo and creativity
Suppose that the ontogenesis of strong wool is influenced by the prevalence of another trait in the population, call it 'black wool'. Suppose that selection influences the prevalence of black wool in the population. Then, selection has a place in the explanation of Steve's strong wool.
The importance of this argument is that it introduces developmental factors. Traits are not merely genetically determined; the gene 'for' a given trait might need to be placed in a certain environment before that trait can develop. Part of what is needed for strong wool to develop in one sheep is the presence of black wool in other sheep. (Never mind why or how this might be so. A more realistic example is this: the female rat abstains from eating her young only if she is allowed to lick her genitalia during pregnancy. Since selection has made it the case that mothers lick their genitalia, the development of restraint with respect to eating her young is explained by selection.) Now if selection is responsible for the presence of black wool in the population, then, with the cooperation of developmental factors, selection has had an impact on the development of strong wool in Steve.
Enter individual essences
In (Matthen, [1999] ), I specifically noted that my argument could be defeated by the view that it is a necessary characteristic of Steve that he has Suzy and Sam as parents. (I will modify this concession below.) It is a consequence of this view, 'Origin Essentialism', as Pust calls it, that no offspring that Suzy had with a mate other than Sam could have been Steve. (Equally, no offspring sired by Sam on another ewe would have been Steve either.) Since selection does not explain why Suzy mated with Sam (rather than any other sheep), it does not explain why Steve has strong wool. The most that it can explain is why all of Suzy's offspring have strong wool, and this is a distributive fact, not an individual fact.
Those familiar with the literature on causality will be reminded here of David Lewis's notion ([1986] , Postscript E) of the 'fragility' of causes and effects. Lewis had proposed that C causes E if and only if E would not have occurred if C had not. Now suppose that two assassins are trailing Mafia Boss. A1 gets to him first. Even if A1 had not got to him, Mafia Boss would have been killed-A2 would have seen to that. Does it follow that A1 was not the cause of the killing of Mafia Boss? One possible response to this question is: 'No, because if A1 had not got to him, that killing of Mafia Boss, would not have occurred, though some such killing may have. Thus A1 is responsible for the killing that did occur.' Call an entity 'fragile' if it has a 'thick' essence of this kind, and does not survive in possible worlds where 'it' has been slightly modified. In the case of fragile entities, it may be the case that they themselves are not causable in various alternative ways, but that some entity like themselves are so causable. This parallels what the AntiIndividualists claim about Steve. I was pointing out, in effect, that AntiIndividualism could be saved if biological organisms were taken to be fragile in Lewis's sense.
I dismissed this argument, saying that this kind of metaphysical consideration was out of place in the arena of scientific explanation. As far as population genetics is concerned, I said, organisms are merely 'receptacles' for genes, and the kinds of modal identity conditions implied by Origin Essentialism are out of place in this scientific discipline. In his recent article, Lewens ([2001] ) responds by investigating the modal identity conditions of receptacles. (The receptacle claim was an obiter dictum, a dismissal of supervenient entities; still, I wonder if I can grab some of the credit for opening up this exciting new area of metaphysics, fundable by grants from Tupperware, Corning, Metal Box . . .) Lewens argues that the receptacle view of organisms cannot, on any plausible interpretation, uphold Individualism in exactly the way I suggested.
Pust and Lewens take the position that since the Theory of Natural Selection lacks the means to identify Steve, it cannot by itself answer explanatory questions about Steve. Against the background of Origin Essentialism, or perhaps of other theories about the individual essences of biological organisms, the explanations offered by the Theory fail to translate downwards from populations to individuals. On the other hand, Lewens thinks that in the context of a different metaphysical theory, the Theory of Abstract Receptacles, the Theory may well be able to explain the traits of individuals. (I will exploit this concession for my own ends in Section 5.) He argues, however, that on this theory, Individualism applies to asexually reproducing organisms too. (This is a conclusion that I am happy to concede.)
The implication is that both Individualism and its opponents require extra metaphysical baggage. Travelling light does not favour either side. (Sober accepts the conclusion in this form-personal communication.) In my view, this is wrong. In what follows, I will try to show that a metaphysically neutral understanding of natural selection will support Individualism.
How can selection not have individual-level effects?
The reason Anti-Individualism seems counter-intuitive to me is that the causal relations involved in selection occur at the individual level. Let me explain. There is within population genetics a statistical style of explanation in which the only facts considered have to do with distributions, frequencies and probabilities. Such facts concern ensembles; they are e-level facts, as I will call them. Sober's point seems to have been that e-level facts are all that 'selection' can explain. And this seems initially plausible: if population genetics is taken to be the science of evolutionary change, then since this science is silent about individuals, it seems to follow that causal relations in evolutionary theory do not involve individuals, only distributions.
However, notice that all the arguments recounted above (including Sober's) are founded on i-level events and causal relations-events involving individuals such as how a particular student was admitted to a class, how an asexual organism got created then destroyed, how a sheep with weak wool got eliminated, and so on. At first glance, this is puzzling. If the argument depends on e-level facts, then why are we looking at i-level facts at all? The answer is that i-level facts are the base on which the e-level facts of statistical population genetics are founded. At the e-level, selection is the unfolding of certain probability distributions. At the i-level, it is nothing but matings, mutations, births, deaths, and the like-these are the events that accumulate to produce changes of frequency at the e-level. In sum, the probability distributions that occur at the e-level supervene on i-level events. What is happening in the above examples is that the statistical trends dealt with in population genetics are being unpacked in terms of i-level causal relations.
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(My worry about Neander's creativity claim above is that it is unclear how she wants to unpack 'selection'.) Now, it is unclear to me how e-level trends can occur without having bubbled up from the individual level. This supervenience of the e-level on the i-level has to reflect on explanatory connections somehow. The argument is simple. If:
(1) selection consists of a collection of i-level events, then since (2) i-level events have i-level effects, it follows that (3) selection must have an identifiable impact at the i-level.
So, if (4) the fact that all sheep have strong wool is caused by selection, then (5) selection must have been the cause of some i-level event involving sheep having strong wool.
But i-level events are events involving individuals. This is the intuition that Anti-Individualism fails to accommodate. Whatever else might be wrong or misguided about this intuition, it seems to me that fragility is not a good reason for throwing it out. Surely there are some individual events underlying distributive events. If they do not involve Steve, then they must involve some other, less fragile individual. This is why it is puzzling how an AntiIndividualist conclusion can be drawn from the kind of i-level unpacking of selection which we have encountered. We were considering the historical sequence of births, deaths, and matings that led to Steve's parents, Suzy and Sam, having their mate-choice limited in a certain way. Where did this i-level history suddenly go distributive? Must it not have ensued in individual events? Let us allow, for the sake of argument, that mating is random among sheep. Suppose, therefore, that Suzy would just as soon have mated with Sol as with Sam. This means, I agree, that the i-level selection history did not bias things in favour of Sam over Sol. Does it follow that selection was not a cause (or an explanation) of Suzy mating with Sam and giving birth to Steve? According to the late Wesley Salmon's theory of causation ([1984] ), this does not follow. You toss a fair coin in a room without air currents or unequal temperatures. It comes up heads. You toss it again in similar conditions. It comes up tails. Does this lack of bias imply that the fairness of the coin, air conditions and your toss didn't cause the coin to come up heads the first time (and tails the second), and didn't explain why these events occurred? No said Salmon: both outcomes, heads and tails, belong to a homogeneous reference class, i.e., there was no additional factor that, when taken into account, would have increased the probability of one over the other. Within a homogeneous reference class, Salmon insists, the very same factors explain all possible outcomes. In the above case, the same factors explain both outcomes; there is nothing to differentiate them. Since we have mentioned all of the factors relevant to the outcome, and since they do not favour one outcome over the other, they constitute the best available explanation of whichever outcome occurs. I completely agree with Salmon on this point. There are sets of mutually excluding events such that whichever one occurs, the same causes must be cited.
The contrastive theory of explanation is sometimes wheeled in at this point. The explanatory factors do not distinguish between Sam and Sol, it is said, therefore it does not explain why Suzy chose Sam instead of Sol: it only explains why Suzy chose Sam instead of an aa sheep. Well, maybe: but the Anti-Individualist conclusion drawn still doesn't seem right to me. The history of events right up to Suzy choosing Sam could (if mating was indeed random) equally have led to either outcome. What follows is that the history does not fully explain either this choice or the alternative, and further that it would have been an equally good (partial) explanation if Sol had been chosen. What if mating was not random among sheep? This does not change the situation. In this case, there is an additional factor F that made Suzy's choice of Sam more likely. It does not follow that selection was not an explanatory factor. All that follows is that F has to be added to selection in order to get a more complete answer. So right from the beginning, without bringing in the question of essences, I think the Anti-Individualist argument has gone off the rails.
5 Why can't we get rid of essences we don't like?
Lewens appeals to criteria of cross-world identification to get his AntiIndividualist result. 'Suppose we think that those nearest worlds where selection for wool strength is weak are worlds where Suzy mates not with Sam, but with some sheep that is aa,' he says ([2001] , p. 592). Then he goes on to question whether Suzy's offspring in this world-call it WS (for weak selection)-would really be Steve. But is it so simple to identify who is who in WS? Lewens seems to think that we can just replay the movie right up to the birth of the relevant individual, and then just check his passport. But I don't think that this is right. I am much more inclined to take a view like the one proposed by David Lewis about the matter. David Lewis-I will continue to refer to him by his full name in order to help the reader avoid confusion with 'Lewens'-insists that there might be many overlapping individuals present in such scenes.
Intuitively, when Sam and Suzy have a lamb, just those three individuals are involved. For a metaphysician like David Lewis, there are many more. Some of these individuals are differentiated by their temporal extent. Let us illustrate this by taking a look at little Steve. There is a structure of co-located molecules here. Let us call this 'Steve (m)'. Steve (m) does not last very long at all. As soon as Steve takes a breath and metabolizes a bit, that particular molecular structure is dispersed, though Steve remains. We conclude that Steve (m) is different from Steve, though for a moment they coincided. Then again, there is the mereological sum, Steve (s), of the matter in Steve (m). Steve (s) might last forever. It, too, is an individual that coincided with Steve for a moment, but no longer does. Then there is Steve's body. On most plausible accounts this lasts longer than Steve: even after Steve dies, it continues to exist for at least a short while. So we have identified at least four distinct individuals in the scene, where perception reveals only one. All four coincide at the moment of checking; they all present the same passport. Now, according to David Lewis, there are also several modally differentiated individuals here. Let us concede, for the sake of argument, that Steve is identified by his parentage. Lewens concedes that there might be another individual here whose identity does not depend on parentage, namely an 'abstract receptacle'. (For present purposes, it does not matter what this is exactly.) Now, he thinks that as metaphysicians we have to check to see which one of these individuals is present in WS-Steve or the abstract receptacle. The point overlooked is that somebody like David Lewis does not choose. He does not examine the birthing event in order to determine which individual has been born, i.e., Steve, or the abstract receptacle. According to him, both are present in the real world. They 'coincide' in the actual world, but diverge in other non-actual worlds. If Lewens and Pust are right about origin essentialism, i.e., if Steve's identity is determined by his parentage, then Steve is not present is WS. However, the abstract receptacle might well be present there.
In Matthen ([1999] ), I argued that since the theory of natural selection has no opinion about origin essentialism, it should not be saddled with the consequences of origin essentialism. David Lewis's view gives us another way of putting the point. Origin Essentialism implies that the theory of natural selection simply does not deal with Steve. It still does not follow that this theory explains only distributive facts. It explains the properties of one of the other individuals that coincides with Steve in the actual world. Since the AntiEssentialist tendency of the theory of natural selection seems incongruent with the postulation of highly fragile individuals, it seems more plausible to say that it deals with a less fragile individual, i.e., one with a thinner essence.
And this is what the theory of receptacles offers us.
Our intuitions about Origin Essentialism are highly context-dependent. Couples going through a divorce often appeal to one form of this doctrine when each says that they don't regret the marriage, since without it these children, the objects of their love, would not have been born. On the other hand, a lot of us can recollect wishing that somebody else had been our father, or mother, or thinking wistfully that Prince Andrew is so-o lucky to have been born into the Royal Family. We identify certain individuals in certain ways for certain purposes, and tie a lot of our speculations about possibilities to that way of identifying them. Population genetics and evolutionary biology are not exceptions to this observation. They, too, identify individuals in ways that bias their assessment of identity in other possible worlds. Now, it is clear that evolutionary biology is unfriendly to essences of all kinds. Again and again, it has thrown up enough new possibilities to defeat even the most entrenched necessity. That is why it is important not to saddle it with demanding metaphysical doctrines of essence. It seems to me that one clean way to avoid doing this is simply to stipulate that the domain of evolutionary biology consists of objects with very thin essences. Perhaps we must acknowledge that things like Steve-born-of-Suzyand-Sam exist. But why should we not say that evolutionary biology deals only with things like Steve-the-receptacle? If so, Individualism could be on the right track.
Is sex necessary?
To conclude, I should like to outline a difficulty that Anti-Individualists need to face, if they insist on evolutionary biology dealing with individuals with thick essences. These Anti-Individualists maintain that: *(6) It is essential to Steve that he was sexually reproduced by Suzy and Sam.
It follows that: *(7) It is essential to Steve that he was sexually reproduced. Now, it is one of the big open problems in the Theory of Evolution why sex evolved. Whatever the solution to this problem might be, it is evident that (8) It is not necessary that any organism is sexually reproduced. Now, (8) does not contradict *(7), since it is not necessary that Steve should exist. So the contingency of sexual reproduction does not logically contradict Anti-Individualism. Still, in order to make *(7) and (8) cohere, a convincing story needs to be told about why Steve would not have existed if sex had not evolved. On the face of it, this story would make Steve's capacity for sexual reproduction an effect of selection. But Anti-Individualists want to maintain that evolution had no causal-explanatory power with respect to the existence or properties of these individuals. Perhaps there is a logically consistent way out of this difficulty. I am not so sure that in the end this way will be cohere with the best interpretations of contemporary biological science.
